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EXERCISING WITH NERI V. RETAIL MARINE CORP. 
MARK PETTIT, JR.* 
Teachers of contract law are blessed.  We are blessed with first-year 
students who for the most part are bright, interesting, and eager to learn the 
subject.  We are blessed because contract law gives us lots of doctrine to play 
with.  And, like all teachers of “One Ls,” we are blessed because we can see 
our students progress, and then can shamelessly take credit for their 
development. 
I find that today’s law students are quick and creative, and can assimilate 
large quantities of information.  But many of my students have not previously 
been asked to read, articulate, or reason with the extreme care often necessary 
for lawyers.  The “careful and precise” portion of their brains needs exercise.  
So I find myself spending increasing amounts of time on what we are fond of 
calling “skills training.”  I find statutory construction to be a particularly 
effective vehicle for this kind of skills training, and I find Neri v. Retail Marine 
Corp.1 to provide particularly effective exercises in statutory construction. 
I began my contracts teaching career with the Dawson and Harvey 
casebook,2 and I am currently using the casebook of my colleague, Randy 
Barnett.3  Both books, along with several others,4 use Neri as a principal case.  
I am a contracts teacher in the teach-remedies-first camp.  I thus use Neri, 
which deals with remedies for buyer’s breach of a contract to buy a boat, as an 
 
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.  I owe thanks to my colleagues Daniela 
Caruso, Ward Farnsworth, Fred Lawrence, Maureen O’Rourke and David Snyder for their 
comments on an earlier draft, and to research assistants Joel Kress and Brian Song. 
 1. 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1972). 
 2. JOHN P. DAWSON & WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY, CASES AND COMMENT ON 
CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1977). 
 3. RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE (2d ed. 1999). 
 4. STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW (1995); MICHAEL L. CLOSEN, 
RICHARD M. PERLMUTTER & JEFFREY D. WITTENBERG, CONTRACTS: CONTEMPORARY CASES, 
COMMENTS, AND PROBLEMS (1984); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC 
CONTRACT LAW (6th ed. 1996); FRIEDRICH KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE & ANTHONY T. 
KRONMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1986); ARTHUR ROSETT & DANIEL J. 
BUSSEL, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION (6th ed. 1999); ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS 
L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY (2d ed. 1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. 
HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 
1997).  This list may not be exhaustive. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1488 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1487 
introduction to statutory construction in general and to the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) in particular.  Neri presents a treasure trove of 
interpretive puzzles and problems from the very specific and simple to the very 
broad and complicated.  For those who do not begin their courses with 
remedies, the case is rich enough to support a productive discussion at any 
point in the course. 
I usually spend two hours working through Neri.  Rather than present a 
general description of how I use this case for my skills training purposes and 
why I believe it is effective, I think it might be more helpful to present an 
account of my Neri class in dialogue form, so that you can judge for yourself 
whether there is something here that might be useful to you.  I certainly do not 
offer this dialogue as a model class to be copied.  We all know that different 
instructors can use the same case to teach any number of different things, and 
Neri can serve as the basis for discussion of many questions that I do not raise 
here. 
My own goal for the Neri discussion is not so much that students 
understand and retain the substance of the U.C.C. provisions (which might 
well change by the time they are practicing lawyers), but rather that they 
improve their skill and build their confidence in interpreting difficult texts.  On 
a more specific level, I want students to begin to learn what it means to work 
carefully, word by word, through a complicated textual maze, to appreciate the 
need for precision, to recognize that the bottom line conclusion must be 
checked to see if it makes sense, and to look to the underlying purposes of the 
text to resolve ambiguities. 
Although what follows is not a verbatim transcript of an actual, single 
class, it does reflect a reasonably typical exchange, using the device of an 
above-average but inexperienced student.  So here goes. 
 
Instructor: Mr./Ms. [One L], would you please relate the facts of Neri v. 
Retail Marine Corp.? 
 
Student: The Neris entered into a contract with Retail Marine Corporation 
to buy a boat for the price of $12,587.40.  They made an initial deposit of $40, 
and then soon increased the deposit to $4,250 in order to assure immediate 
delivery, rather than delivery within four to six weeks as originally specified.  
Six days after the date of the contract the Neris’ lawyer sent a letter to Retail 
Marine rescinding the contract because Mr. Neri was about to go into the 
hospital for surgery, and thus it would be “impossible for Mr. Neri to make any 
payments.” 
 
Instructor: Let me interrupt for a minute to ask what you think about Mr. 
Neri’s justification for seeking to rescind the contract.  Should his 
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hospitalization and surgery allow him to cancel his order for the boat and get 
his deposit back? 
 
Student: It’s unfortunate that Mr. Neri has to go to the hospital, and I feel 
sorry for him, but I don’t think he should be let off from his contract.  After all, 
it’s not really Retail Marine’s problem. 
 
Instructor: I see.  So if I order a pair of shoes from you, and before you 
deliver them my legs are amputated I still have to pay you for the shoes?  After 
all, it’s not your problem. 
 
Student: I think that’s the way the system works. 
 
Instructor: But is that the way the system should work?5  If you were 
making the rules, would you make me pay for the shoes? 
 
Student: I don’t think I would make you pay as a personal matter, but I 
think I should have the legal right to make you pay. 
 
Instructor: Does the Neri court agree with you, that Mr. Neri still has a 
legal obligation to buy the boat? 
 
Student: I don’t think that the court discusses it. 
 
Instructor: Does that mean that we do not know what the court’s position 
is? 
 
Student: Well, since the court goes right to the question of the proper 
damages for breach, I guess the court assumes that Mr. Neri was bound by the 
contract. 
 
Instructor: I think that’s right.  We will be studying the subject of changed 
circumstances at some length at the end of the course, but in the meantime be 
alert for situations in which a party might argue that his or her performance 
should be excused because of unexpected events.  I do have a poem expressing 
how Mr. Neri might have felt.6 
 
 5. It seems to me that in recent years students have become less willing to express their 
own views about what the law should be.  I view this perceived trend as unfortunate, and I 
wonder if other law teachers have the same perception. 
 6. During my first year of teaching Contracts, one of my students handed me a poem that 
he had written about the case we were discussing that day.  It was clever, and I read it to the class.  
That started a practice in my classes of students writing poems and (gulp!) songs to be read or 
sung (!) by me from the podium.  I have been amazed by the creativity of my students.  I think 
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Don’t be mean. 
I’ve just found cancer 
On my spleen. 
 
I know I said 
I’d buy your boat, 
But I’m afraid 
My loan won’t float. 
 
The Code is with you, 
This is true. 
I know—I’ve read it 
Till I’m blue. 
 
But look, the thing is, 
I can’t pay. 
In fact, I’m dying 
More each day. 
 
So please return 
My deposit, whole. 
And light a candle 
For my soul.7 
 
[Applause] 
Now please resume your statement of the facts. 
 
Student: Okay.  At the time it received the letter from the Neris’ lawyer, 
Retail Marine had already received delivery of the boat from the manufacturer.  
So Retail Marine refused to refund the Neris’ deposit. 
 
Instructor: So who sued whom for what? 
 
 
that the poems and songs help greatly to reduce the tension that naturally results when an 
instructor asks a series of difficult questions to non-volunteers, as I do.  It is hard to be too 
terrified of an instructor who earlier had made a fool of himself trying to sing contracts words to a 
Britney Spears song. 
 7. Written by David Bohanan, Boston University School of Law class of 1990. 
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Student: The Neris sued to recover their deposit.  Then Retail Marine 
counterclaimed for breach of contract and sought damages of $4,250, which is 
the same amount as the deposit. 
 
Instructor: Why did Retail Marine counterclaim for $4,250, when it 
already had the $4,250? 
 
Student: I don’t know.  Maybe Retail Marine just wanted a court to 
confirm that it was legally entitled to keep the money. 
 
Instructor: I am not sure about the answer either, although your 
explanation seems to be a likely possibility.  Now, what were the results in the 
courts below? 
 
Student: Retail Marine won summary judgment below on the Neris’ 
liability for breach.  Then there was a trial on the issue of Retail Marine’s 
damages, and the court awarded . . . . 
 
Instructor: Before we get to the award, what items of damages did Retail 
Marine attempt to prove and recover at trial? 
 
Student: Lost profit of $2,579, . . . . 
 
Instructor: What does lost profit mean?  How would you calculate it? 
 
Student: What Retail Marine would make on the deal? 
 
Instructor: Right.  And how would you calculate it? 
 
Student: I guess I would subtract the cost of the boat to Retail Marine from 
the money that Retail Marine would receive. 
 
Instructor: Very good.  We might say gross revenue minus expenses, but 
you have the right idea.  Now what else did Retail Marine attempt to recover at 
trial? 
 
Student: Incidental expenses of $674 for storage, upkeep, finance charges 
and insurance and $1,250 for attorneys’ fees. 
 
Instructor: Notice that these amounts add up to $4,503, and that Retail 
Marine originally counterclaimed for only $4,250.  Apparently, once Retail 
Marine had to go through the expense of a trial, it was no longer content 
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simply to keep the deposit as full payment of damages.  Did Retail Marine get 
a judgment for $4,503? 
 
Student: No.  After the trial, the trial court awarded Retail Marine only 
$500 on its counterclaim and directed that the Neris get back $3,750 of their 
deposit.  Retail Marine then appealed to the Appellate Division, which 
affirmed without writing an opinion.  Retail Marine was then given leave to 
appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, which modified the lower court 
order. 
 
Instructor: So we are looking at the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the 
highest court in the state of New York.  Before we get to the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeals, let’s talk about how the trial judge reached the conclusion 
that Retail Marine could keep only $500.  What law did the trial court look to? 
 
Student: Section 2-718(2)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
 
Instructor: But why the U.C.C.?  The Neris’ purchase appears to be a 
consumer transaction, not a commercial transaction. 
 
Student: But it is still a sale of a good. 
 
Instructor: Exactly right.  Remember that Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies to 
consumer transactions for the sale of goods unless specifically displaced by a 
consumer protection law.8  Okay.  Now why did the trial judge start with 
section 2-718? 
 
Student: Because it seems to apply to the situation. 
 
Instructor: Right.  Lawyers and judges usually look for the section that 
deals most specifically with the factual situation being considered.  Let’s look 
at section 2-718(2) carefully.  Did the trial judge construe this section 
correctly?  It says: “Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods 
because of the buyer’s breach . . . .”  Is this our case? 
 
Student: Yes, because the court ruled for Retail Marine on liability, and 
Retail Marine never delivered the boat to the Neris. 
 
 8. For some reason, my students all too often assume that Article 2 of the U.C.C. does not 
apply to consumer transactions, or, even worse, that it applies only to contracts between 
merchants.  Professor Burnham’s similar experience inspired him to write an article.  See Scott J. 
Burnham, Why Do Law Students Insist that Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Applies 
Only to Merchants and What Can We Do About It?, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1271 (1997). 
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Instructor: “ . . . the buyer is entitled to restitution of any amount by which 




Instructor: “ . . . exceeds (a) the amount to which the seller is entitled by 
virtue of terms liquidating the seller’s damages in accordance with subsection 
(1) . . . .”  We will soon study so-called liquidated damages clauses in 
contracts, but there is no mention of such a clause here, so we can disregard 
this language for now.  “ . . . or (b) in the absence of such terms, twenty 
percent of the value of the total performance for which the buyer is obligated 
under the contract or $500, whichever is smaller.”  What is the value of the 
total performance for which the buyer is obligated? 
 
Student: Would that be the contract price of $12,587.40? 
 








Instructor: Did the Court of Appeals agree that section 2-718 was the 
correct starting point for deciding this case? 
 
Student: Yes.  The court says specifically that “[t]he issue is governed in 
the first instance by section 2-718 . . . .”10 
 
Instructor: So why did the Court of Appeals modify the trial court’s 
award?  What did the trial judge do wrong? 
 
Student: The trial judge did not look at the seller’s remedy in section 2-
718(3). 
 
 9. Occasionally, a student will read the language to be 20% of total value of performance or 
20% of $500 (i.e., $100), but, as Professor Nordstrom has pointed out, if that is what the drafters 
intended, it would seem that they would have simply said $100.  See ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 556 n.1 (1970).  I generally do not raise this issue unless a 
student wants to make the argument. 
 10. Neri, 285 N.E. 2d at 313. 
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Instructor: Right.  The trial judge stopped reading section 2-718 too soon.  
Let’s look at the language of section 2-718(3).  “The buyer’s right to restitution 
under subsection (2) is subject to offset . . . .”  What does “subject to offset” 
mean? 
 
Student: I think it means subject to subtraction of what follows. 
 
Instructor: That sounds right to me.  “ . . . subject to offset to the extent 
that the seller establishes (a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of 
this Article [that is, Article 2 of the U.C.C.] other than subsection (1) [of § 2-
718], and (b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the buyer directly 
or indirectly by reason of the contract.”  Let’s consider (b) first, to get it out of 
the way.  Did the Neris receive any direct or indirect benefits by virtue of this 
contract? 
 
Student: Well, they did not receive the boat, or anything else that I can see. 
 
Instructor: I agree. So we can concentrate on (a): Can Retail Marine 
establish a right to recover damages under other provisions of Article 2?  What 
other provisions should seller be looking at?  Seller’s remedies are listed in 
section 2-703.  Let’s take a look at section 2-703.  Since Retail Marine did 
resell the boat, seller might want to look at section 2-706.11  Indeed, there is an 
argument that if 2-706 applies, then seller cannot do better under section 2-
708.12  I don’t want to take the time to discuss that argument now, but I can 
discuss it after class with anyone who is interested.  Seller could also try 
section 2-709, but an examination of that section suggests that it would not 
apply in this case.  In any event, the Court of Appeals looks to section 2-708, 
and so let us turn to that section. 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) [which we will get to soon] and to the provisions 
of this Article with respect to proof of market price (Section 2-723) [which you 
would have to check, but which I do not want to take the time to explore now], 
the measure of damages for non-acceptance or repudiation by the buyer [which 
seems to be what happened in Neri] is the difference between the market price 
at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price together with any 
 
 11. Occasionally I work through the damages calculations under U.C.C. § 2-706 to show 
why Retail Marine prefers U.C.C. § 2-708. 
 12. This argument was considered and rejected in R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 
826 F.2d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Robert J. Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of 
Seller’s Damages: Sales Act and Commercial Code Results Compared, 18 STAN. L. REV. 66, 101 
n.174 (1965) ).  But see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
§ 7-7 (4th ed. 1995). 
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incidental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses 
saved in consequence of the buyer’s breach. 
Okay, do we know “the market price at the time and place for tender”? 
 
Student: I don’t see that amount mentioned in the opinion. 
 
Instructor: Do we have any information about what the boat was worth on 
the retail market? 
 
Student: Well, we know that the Neris agreed to pay $12,587.40 for the 
boat, and that it was sold four months later to somebody else for the same 
price. 
 
Instructor: That’s right.  Although these two sale prices do not necessarily 
mean that the market price was exactly the same, they do provide some good 
evidence of the market price.  So let’s assume that the market price is 
$12,587.40, remembering that market price is a fact to be proved at trial.  Now 
what is the “unpaid contract price”? 
 
Student: I think that would be the full contract price, which is the 
$12,587.40, less the amount of the down payment, which is $4,250.  Let’s see.  
That comes out to $8,337.40. 
 
Instructor: So what is the difference between the market price and the 
unpaid contract price? 
 
Student: That would be $12,587.40 minus $8,337.40, which would bring 
us back to $4,250, the amount of the down payment. 
 
Instructor: Now section 2-708(1) says that we add incidental damages and 
directs us to section 2-710.  What did the Court of Appeals say about Retail 
Marine’s incidental damages? 
 
Student: The Court of Appeals said that the trial judge was wrong in 
denying Retail Marine’s claim for $674 in incidental damages for storage, 
upkeep, finance charges and insurance for the boat for the time between when 
the Neris should have paid and when the boat was resold. 
 
Instructor: Good.  So let’s add $674 to our calculation of damages under 
section 2-708(1).  That gives us $4,250 plus $674, or $4,924.  Now the last 
clause of section 2-708(1) says: “ . . . but less expenses saved in consequence 
of the buyer’s breach.”  Did Retail Marine save any expenses because of the 
Neris’ breach? 
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Student: I don’t think so, since they already paid for and received the boat. 
 
Instructor: It does seem that Retail Marine saved little or nothing because 
of the breach.  So let’s assume that there were no expenses saved.  That leaves 
us with a damages figure under section 2-708(1) of $4,924.  Do you find that 
amount troubling? 
 
Student: I can’t say that I do, although I’m sure I should since you asked 
the question. 
 
Instructor: Isn’t $4,924 more than Retail Marine was asking for, even 
including $1,250 for attorneys’ fees?  Furthermore, notice that Retail Marine’s 
main argument was that it should receive damages under section 2-708(2), and 
section 2-708(2) applies only when the measure of damages under section 2-
708(1) is inadequate for the seller.  It seems that $4,924 is more than adequate 
for Retail Marine in this case.  Something must be wrong with our calculation 
under section 2-708(1).  Do you have any idea what we did wrong? 
 
Student: I’m afraid I don’t have a clue. 
 
Instructor: Well, notice that we calculated the difference between the 
market price and the unpaid contract price as the amount of the down payment.  
If the down payment were higher, the difference between the market price and 
unpaid contract price would rise by the same amount.  So the higher the down 
payment, the greater the damages for the seller under section 2-708(1).  Isn’t 
that just exactly the opposite of how it should be?  The more money the seller 
receives from the buyer, the less his damages should be. 
 
Student volunteer: Maybe we should disregard the word “unpaid” before 
“contract price.” 
 
Instructor: That is interesting, because that is exactly the suggestion of 
some commentators analyzing the interaction between sections 2-708 and 2-
718, and we will look at the reasons for that suggestion later.  But the word 
“unpaid” is not the source of the problem with our calculations under section 
2-708(1).  We are making a very fundamental mistake in construing section 2-
708(1).  The mistake is not one that you would make if you were a lawyer 
representing either party here.  But I should say that many, if not most, of my 
students make the same error.  The error, although fundamental, is quite 
understandable.  The key to understanding the problem is to recognize that our 
method of calculation gives more damages to the seller when the down 
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payment goes up and seller’s damages should thus be less.  Can anyone correct 
our error? 
 
Student volunteer: Should we be subtracting market price from unpaid 
contract price, rather than the other way around? 
 
Instructor: Bingo!  We have inverted the minuend and the subtrahend.13  
Think about the purpose of section 2-708.  The purpose is to compensate the 
seller’s loss.  When does the seller have a loss?  When the unpaid contract 
price is greater than the market price.  That is, the seller is hurt by the buyer’s 
breach if the seller would have received more from the buyer’s completing 
performance than the seller can get by selling to someone else on the market.  
So for seller’s damages we subtract market price from unpaid contract price. 
Notice that it’s the other way around for the buyer when the seller 
breaches.  The buyer is hurt when the buyer has to pay more on the market 
than the amount remaining unpaid on the contract.  So for buyer’s damages we 
subtract unpaid contract price from market price. 
Lawyers simply refer to the contract/market differential for both buyer’s 
and seller’s damages and assume that it is obvious how to do the subtraction.  
The drafters of section 2-708 thought that it was too obvious to require an 
explanation of how to do the subtraction.  And it would be obvious to you if 
you were handling a real case and could see the real loss of your client.  But it 
was not obvious to us because we were reading the language very literally, as I 
was insisting that we do. 
There is a valuable lesson in the problem we just worked through.  
Although it is imperative that lawyers read statutes very carefully and very 
literally, it is also vital to read statutory language with an appreciation of the 
purposes underlying the statutory language.  If you do not do so, you can make 
some very embarrassing mistakes. 
Let me provide some simple numbers to make sure that we now all 
understand how and why the contract/market differential works. 
[On the blackboard:] 
 
 13. Apparently elementary school teachers no longer use these terms.  Most of my students 
have never heard these words, and they view my use of them as still further evidence of how 
archaic their instructor really is.  Professor Harris used these terms in his analysis of seller’s 
damages, but that was in 1965.  See Harris, supra note 12, at 79. 
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No Down Payment 
 
 Contract Price Market Price Buyer’s Damages Seller’s Damages 
 
 $500 $600 ? ? 
 
 $500 $400 ? ? 
 
 
$50 Down Payment 
 
Contract Price (Unpaid) Market Price Buyer’s Damages Seller’s Damages 
 
 $500 $450 $600 ? ? 
 
 $500 $450 $400 ? ? 
 
Let’s fill in the blanks using these numbers.  First, with no down payment, if 
the contract price is $500 and the market price is $600 and the seller breaches, 
what are the buyer’s damages? 
 
Student: Well, that is market price of $600 minus unpaid contract price of 
$500, or $100. 
 
Instructor: Right.  Buyer is hurt when the market goes above the contract 
price.  Buyer can take the $500 not paid to the seller and the $100 in damages 
and buy the same item on the market.  What are seller’s damages? 
 
Student: That would be the unpaid contract price of $500 minus the market 
price of $600, or minus $100. 
 
Instructor: Right.  But since courts do not generally deal in negative 
damages, we’ll simply say that seller’s damages are zero.  Now what if the 
market price goes down to $400? 
 
Student: Then buyer’s damages would be zero, and seller’s damages would 
be $100. 
 
Instructor: Now we’ve got it!  Seller is hurt when the market goes below 
the contract price.  Seller can take the $400 from the resale and the $100 in 
damages and end up with the $500 originally expected. 
Now let’s look at the situation when there has been a down payment so 
that we can understand why the word “unpaid” is in the equations before 
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“contract price.”  If buyer made a $50 down payment and the market price 
went up to $600, what would buyer’s damages be? 
 
Student: Market price of $600 minus unpaid contract price of $450, or 
$150. 
 
Instructor: Yes.  Now we have to make sure that buyer gets his $50 back in 
addition to the $100 so he can buy on the market for $600 and still come out as 
well as if the original seller had performed.  Now we can also see that seller’s 
damages are zero when the market goes up.  What are the answers if the 
market goes down to $400? 
 
Student: Buyer’s damages would be market price of $400 minus unpaid 
contract price of $450, or minus $50.  Zero.14  Seller’s damages would be 
unpaid contract price of $450 minus market price of $400, or $50. 
 
Instructor: Very good.  Do these answers make sense? 
 
Student: Let’s see.  Buyer is not hurt because buyer can buy for $400 and 
has paid seller $50, and buyer expected to pay $500.  Seller is hurt because 
now she can get $400 on the market and has the original buyer’s $50 down 
payment, but she is still $50 short of the $500 she expected. 
 
Instructor: Excellent.  I think we have beaten the contract/market 
differential into the ground.  Let’s go back to Neri.  Notice that we have not 
reached the real issue in the case yet.  What are Retail Marine’s damages under 
section 2-708(1)? 
 
Student: Zero, because unpaid contract price of $8,337 minus market price 
of $12,587.40 equals minus $4,250.  Even adding $674 for incidental damages, 
seller’s damages are in negative territory. 
 
Instructor: That makes sense.  We can now understand why Retail Marine 
thinks that damages under section 2-708(1) are inadequate, and wants the court 
to use section 2-708(2).  Let’s look at the language of section 2-708(2).  “If the 
measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the seller 
in as good a position as performance would have done . . . .”  Is there another 
way to say that? 
 
 14. I rarely interrupt here to point out that the buyer can recover the $50 down payment upon 
breach by the seller even if the buyer benefits from the breach.  See U.C.C. § 2-711(1).  We 
discuss at some length elsewhere how the concept of restitution can trump the concept of 
expectation, and the arguments for and against such a trumping effect. 
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Student: I don’t know what you mean. 
 
Instructor: Well, how might Fuller and Perdue have phrased this idea of 
inadequacy?  Inadequate to do what? 
 
Student: Protect the expectation interest? 
 
Instructor: Exactly.  If the contract/market differential is inadequate to 
protect the seller’s expectation interest, returning to the language of section 2-
708(2), “ . . . then the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable 
overhead) which the seller would have made from full performance by the 
buyer . . . .”  We know from our earlier statement of the facts that Retail 
Marine offered proof that its lost profit was $2,579.  But how do we know if 
section 2-708(1) is inadequate?  Can we generalize about when a court should 
award lost profit damages under section 2-708(2)?  By the way, we have now 
finally arrived at the main issue in the case. 
 
Student: Well, the court talks about using section 2-708(2) when the seller 
has an unlimited or inexhaustible supply of standard-priced goods. 
 
Instructor: Do you agree with the court’s description you’ve just quoted of 
when section 2-708(1) is inadequate and lost profit should be awarded? 
 
Student: It sounds good to me. 
 
Instructor: But does any seller really have an unlimited supply of 
anything?  No supply is infinite.  Can you think of a better way to phrase what 
the court is getting at? 
 
Student: How about when seller has more goods to sell than there are 
buyers for those goods? 
 




Instructor: I think that is a good beginning.  We might phrase the idea like 
this: When a seller’s supply of interchangeable goods exceeds the demand for 
those goods, a breach by a buyer and a resale to someone else at the same price 
would not make the seller as well off as if the buyer had not breached.  It is 
frequently said that, but for the buyer’s breach, seller would have sold two 
boats rather than one (or fifty instead of forty-nine). 
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Let’s say that you and I entered into a contract for the sale of my 1973 
American Motors Hornet15 for $600, and you then breached.  I then sold my 
Hornet to another student for $600.  In that case, except perhaps for costs 
incident to finding another buyer, I am just as well off with the other buyer’s 
$600 as I would have been with your $600.  But if I have a fleet of Hornets to 
sell, I can argue that if you had not breached I would have sold one more 
Hornet.  Although Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies only to goods, a similar 
argument could be made for dentists’ appointments or hotel rooms. 
I should tell you that there is a good deal of controversy, especially in the 
academic literature, about when a lost profit measure of damages should be 
used.  Some commentators and courts think that the seller must prove not only 
the ability to produce a supply exceeding demand but also that it would have 
been profitable to produce additional goods before being entitled to lost 
profits.16  Other commentators have even greater reservations about the lost-
profit idea.17  We will have to leave this debate to courses in commercial law. 
So, returning to the text of section 2-708(2), Retail Marine seems to be 
entitled to recover lost profit of $2,579 plus incidental damages of $674.  But 
what about the last phrase of section 2-708(2): “due allowance for costs 
reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale”?  The 
Neris argue that the proceeds of resale were $12,587.40, and they are not 
getting due credit for them!  What does the court say in response to this 
argument? 
 
Student: The court says that the language “due credit for payments or 
proceeds of resale” is inapplicable here.  The court cites authorities for the 
proposition that this phrase refers only to the resale value of scrap or 
components when the seller stops production.18 
 
Instructor: We might have hoped that the drafters would have drafted more 
clearly if this is what they intended by the words “due credit for . . . proceeds 
of resale.”  But we might also agree that the phrase cannot mean that the buyer 
 
 15. In fact, my wife and I owned a 1973 Hornet for fifteen years before it died in 1988 of 
terminal rust.  I continue to use the Hornet as the basis for numerous class hypotheticals, thus 
reinforcing the students’ view of their instructor as a creature from another epoch. 
 16. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Measuring Sellers’ Damages: The Lost-Profits 
Puzzle, 31 STAN. L. REV. 323 (1979); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 7-14.  See also R.E. 
Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 17. See Robert E. Scott, The Case for Market Damages: Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle, 
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155 (1990).  See also Morris G. Shanker, The Case for a Literal Reading of 
U.C.C. Section 2-708(2) (One Profit for the Reseller), 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 697 (1973). 
 18. See Neri, 285 N.E.2d at 314 n.2 (citing 1956 N.Y. LAW REV. COMM. 397; 1955 1 N.Y. 
LAW REV. COMM. 761; N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 2-708 (McKinney 1993); 1 WILLIAM F. WILLIER & 
FREDERICK M. HART, BENDER’S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE §2-708; Harris, supra 
note 12, at 104). 
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gets to credit the resale price against the seller’s damages in all cases.  That 
would completely vitiate the effect of section 2-708(2). 
Section 2-708 does not refer to attorneys’ fees.  How does the court rule on 
Retail Marine’s claim for $1,250 of attorneys’ fees? 
 
Student: The court denies recovery of attorneys’ fees. 
 
Instructor: Retail Marine claimed attorneys’ fees under section 1-106 of 
the U.C.C.  Notice that Retail Marine can argue that without recovering 
attorneys’ fees, they will not be “put in as good a position as if the other party 
had fully performed.”  Nevertheless, most American courts deny attorneys’ 
fees to prevailing parties unless there is a specific authorization in the relevant 
statute.  Ask yourself whether you agree with the idea that attorneys’ fees are 
not generally recoverable in contracts cases. 
So it looks like Retail Marine emerges from section 2-708(2) with lost 
profit of $2,579 plus incidental damages of $674, or a total of $3,253.  Let’s 
return to section 2-718 to do the final calculation of how much money Retail 
Marine can keep, and how much it has to return to the Neris.  What is the 
answer? 
 
Student: Well, as you just said, damages were $3,253, so Retail Marine 
keeps this amount and returns the rest to the Neris.  So $4,250 deposit minus 
$3,253 in damages equals $997 to be returned to the Neris. 
 




Instructor: Does anyone disagree with the court’s calculations under 
section 2-718?  Look at the relationship of sections 2-718(2) and 2-718(3).  
Did the court get that right?  Another way to phrase the question is this: What 
happened to the $500 that we came up with when we construed the language of 
section 2-718(2)?  Does anyone see what I am getting at here? 
 
Student volunteer: Section 2-718(3) says that the buyer’s right to 
restitution under subsection (2) is subject to offset by the seller’s right to 
recover damages under other sections of Article 2.  We calculated the buyer’s 
right to restitution under section 2-718(2) as the deposit minus the $500.  Then 
we should subtract the section 2-718(3) damages from that result. 
 
Instructor: Thank you.  That is exactly the argument that I was looking for.  
Under your analysis how much money would the Neris get back? 
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Same student (no longer a volunteer): Let’s see.  Under section 2-718(2), 
the buyer’s right to restitution is the down payment of $4,250 less $500, or 
$3,750.  Next we subtract the section 2-718(3) damages that were calculated to 
be $3,253.  So the Neris get back only $497 of their $4,250 deposit. 
 
Instructor: Very good.  So we have two possible results under section 2-
718: $997 or $497 going back to the Neris.  Which is the right answer? 
 
Student: Now I think $497. 
 
Instructor: That answer does seem to me to be more consistent with the 
language of section 2-718.  Section 2-718(3) says: “The buyer’s right to 
restitution under subsection (2) is subject to offset . . . .”  The buyer’s right to 
restitution under section 2-718(2) is not the entire sum of the buyer’s 
payments, but rather that sum minus 20% of the value of the total performance 
or $500.  Once we calculate that figure, we offset, or subtract, what damages 
we get under section 2-718(3). 
 
Student volunteer: But the language says it is the buyer’s right to 
restitution, not the amount, that is subject to offset. 
 
Instructor: That is an interesting argument—and one that had not occurred 
to me.  Let me think about it for a moment.  [Pause]  Okay, I think your point 
is a good one, but I still think the language “subject to offset” is difficult to 
reconcile with the interpretation that sections 2-718(2) and 2-718(3) operate as 
separate alternatives.  Notice that this is what the interpretive debate comes 
down to.  Is section 2-718(3) an alternative to section 2-718(2), as the New 
York Court of Appeals says in Neri, or are the subsections cumulative, as I am 
suggesting the words “subject to offset” seem to denote? 
Assuming that there is ambiguity in the language (perhaps because of the 
use of “right” to restitution rather than “amount” of restitution), which 
interpretation makes more sense as a policy matter?  Should sections 2-718(2) 
and 2-718(3) be viewed as alternatives or cumulative?  In other words, should 
the $500 be viewed as a minimum damages figure or as a figure to be added to 
actual damages in every case?  If the $500 figure is a minimum (this assumes 
the alternative approach), then if actual damages are $300, the seller can keep 
$500 of the deposit.  But if actual damages are $600, seller can keep only 
$600.  Under the cumulative approach, if actual damages are $300, seller can 
keep $800; if actual damages are $600, seller can keep $1,100. 
To answer which approach is better, we might want to ask first: What is 
the purpose of the $500 (or 20%) provision in section 2-718(2)?  Why should 
sellers be able to keep these amounts, even if they can prove no damages, 
when buyers make deposits? 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1504 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1487 
 
Student: To discourage buyers from breaching? 
 
Instructor: Well, deterring breach is a plausible answer.  But we know that 
the general rule of contract damages at common law is compensation, not 
deterrence or punishment of the breacher.  The U.C.C. generally reaffirms this 
principle.  Why should the U.C.C. depart from this principle when the buyer 
has made a down payment?  Is the buyer who has made a deposit more likely 
to breach than one who has not made a deposit?  Is a buyer who breaches after 
making a deposit more worthy of punishment? 
 
Student: I don’t think so.  Actually, a buyer who has made a deposit seems 
less likely to breach than one who has not made a deposit.  I also don’t see any 
reason why a buyer who has paid some money to the seller should be worthier 
of punishment for breach. 
 
Instructor: Is there any other reason you can think of for allowing sellers to 
keep a down payment even if the seller has no provable damages? 
 
Student: Maybe the seller required a down payment in the first place 
because the seller thought it would be difficult or expensive to prove actual 
damages.  And the buyer knew that the deposit was non-refundable. 
 
Instructor: Good answer!  But as to your point that the buyer knew that the 
deposit was non-refundable, we will soon see, when we study liquidated 
damages clauses, that generally parties cannot enforce agreements to set 
recoveries above anticipated compensatory damages.  I like your idea that the 
deposit may be an attempt to compensate the seller for damages that are real, 
but difficult or expensive to prove.  If that were the justification for the $500 
(or 20%) provision of section 2-718(2), would that argue for the cumulative 
approach or the alternative approach? 
 
Student: I’m not sure.  If the problem is that it’s too expensive to prove 
minor damages, then maybe the alternative approach makes more sense.  But if 
the actual damages are expected always to be greater than the provable 
damages, then I guess the cumulative approach better addresses this problem. 
 
Instructor: Excellent.  I don’t think I can add anything to what you’ve said.  
The fact is that we do not know for certain what the exact purpose of the 20%-
or-$500 rule was.  In some places prior to the U.C.C., a breaching buyer could 
not recover any money paid to a seller, regardless of the amount of the seller’s 
damages.  The 20%-or-$500 rule may have been a compromise. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] EXERCISING WITH NERI V. RETAIL MARINE CORP. 1505 
Now, there is one final problem that I want to discuss before ending our 
analysis of sections 2-718 and 2-708.19  It has to do with the interaction of 
those two sections.  It is a problem resulting from the language of those 
sections that the drafters apparently did not see.  Does anyone see a problem 
here? 
[No response.] 
Remember that earlier in our discussion someone suggested that we 
disregard the word “unpaid” before “contract price” in section 2-708(1).  I said 
then that some commentators had made just that suggestion, but for a different 
reason.  Well, this reason is what I am looking for now.  Does this give anyone 
a clue as to what the problem is? 
[No response.] 
Okay.  I recognize that it is difficult to see this argument without an 
illustration, especially since the problem is not really presented by Neri itself.20 
Consider the following situation:21 Seller and buyer enter into a contract 
for the sale of a used car for $5,000.  Buyer pays $2,000 down and then breaks 
the contract.  Seller sells the car to somebody else for $4,200.  Assume that this 
was a reasonable resale, that there are no incidental damages or savings from 
breach, that there is no liquidated damages clause, and that seller does not have 
a section 2-708(2) lost profit argument. 
First, how much of the $2,000 down payment should seller keep if our only 
goal were to protect seller’s expectation interest? 
 
Student: Well, if the buyer had performed, the seller would have received 
$5,000 for the car.  Now the seller has received $2,000 from the breaching 
buyer and $4,200 from the second buyer.  So the seller should return $1,200 
and keep $800. 
 
Instructor: That seems pretty straightforward.  We want the seller to keep 
just enough so that she gets a total of $5,000 for her car.  Let’s run the numbers 
through sections 2-718 and 2-708.  Starting with section 2-718(2), what is the 




 19. Sometimes I do not even begin a discussion of the following problem concerning the 
interaction of U.C.C. §§ 2-718 and 2-708.  If it has been a long, difficult process to get to this 
point, I often decide that it is better to forgo this final issue. 
 20. In most of my classes, nobody does see the problem at this point.  There have been a few 
exceptions.  One student came to my office to point out the problem before we had reached it in 
class. 
 21. This hypothetical, right down to the numbers used, comes from the excellent discussion 
in NORDSTROM, supra note 9, § 184.  Although this discussion is thirty years old, I have not 
found a better one in any subsequent case or commentary. 
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Instructor: What is 20% of the value of buyer’s total performance? 
 
Student: Twenty percent of $5,000, or $1,000. 
 
Instructor: So $500 is smaller.  What then is the bottom line? 
 
Student: Two thousand dollars exceeds $500 by $1,500, so buyer gets back 
$1,500 and seller keeps $500 under section 2-718(2). 
 
Instructor: Next we go to section 2-708(1) via 2-718(3).  What is the 
market price at the time and place for tender? 
 
Student: If we use the resale price as the market price, then $4,200. 
 
Instructor: Recognizing that the market price is a question of fact, let’s 
proceed on the assumption that the market price is indeed $4,200.  What is the 
unpaid contract price? 
 
Student: Five thousand dollars total price minus $2,000 down payment, or 
$3,000. 
 
Instructor: Which is the minuend and which is the subtrahend? 
 
Student: I have no clue, but we should subtract the market price from the 




Student: Because the seller is damaged only if the unpaid contract price 
exceeds the market price. 
 
Instructor: So what is the result? 
 
Student: Since $3,000 minus $4,200 is a negative number, seller keeps 
only the $500 from section 2-718(2). 
 
Instructor: Notice that this result falls short of protecting the seller’s 
expectation interest.  That cannot have been the intention of the drafters.  What 
is the problem? 
 
Student: I don’t know. 
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Instructor: Look at the figure for unpaid contract price that we used in 
section 2-708(1).  We said it was $3,000, $5,000 minus the $2,000 down 
payment.  But after giving effect to section 2-718(2), is this buyer still $2,000 
out-of-pocket? 
 
Student: Oh, now I see.  If buyer is getting $1,500 back under section 2-
718(2), his down payment should be only $500 and the unpaid contract price 
should be $4,500. 
 
Instructor: What is the calculation under section 2-708(1) using that 
analysis? 
 
Student: Unpaid contract price of $4,500 minus market price of $4,200, or 
$300.  So the buyer’s right to restitution is reduced by $300, down to $1,200.  
Seller gets to keep $800. 
 
Instructor: That would be the correct amount to protect the seller’s 
expectation interest, according to our previous calculation.  But notice also that 
we still have the problem of whether the subparts of section 2-718 are 
alternative or cumulative.  If alternative, then the section 2-718(3) damages of 
$300 are less than the $500 damages under section 2-718(2), and the buyer’s 
right of restitution would remain at $1,500.  So we have not completely 
eliminated the problem by raising the unpaid contract price from $3,000 to 
$4,500.  That is why some commentators have suggested disregarding the 
word “unpaid” in section 2-718(1), when there is a down payment and sections 
2-718 and 2-708 are interacting.22  What would the result be if we disregarded 
the word “unpaid”? 
 
Student: Under section 2-708(1), you would subtract the market price of 
$4,200 from the contract price of $5,000 and get $800. 
 
Instructor: Right.  The suggestion is that to avoid double-counting the 
down payment, we should disregard the word unpaid when we construe section 
2-708(1) after reaching a result under section 2-718(2).  Notice that if there is 
no down payment, and no resort to section 2-718, then “unpaid” must be 
included in section 2-708(1) to avoid overcompensating the seller. 
We still have the old problem of whether the parts of section 2-718 are 
cumulative or alternative.  But now we have the right numbers to choose from.  
The alternative approach would allow seller to keep $800, and thus get her full 
 
 22. See NORDSTROM, supra note 9, § 184.  See also Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co., 743 
P.2d 1212 (Utah 1987). 
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contract/market differential.  The cumulative approach would allow seller to 
keep the $800 and the $500 from section 2-718(2).  Are there any questions? 
 
Student: Which approach do most courts use, the alternative approach or 
the cumulative approach? 
 
Instructor: As we know, the Neri court used the alternative approach 
without any consideration of the cumulative approach.  I have not been able to 
find any case that actually discusses the choice between the two approaches.  
Maybe someone in this class will make new law in this area someday. 
Well, that brings us to the end of our discussion of Neri, section 2-718 and 
section 2-708.  I realize that some of the analysis that we have gone through 
may be difficult for some of you.  This was our first intensive exercise in the 
alien territory of statutory construction.  We will have other opportunities to 
sharpen our skills in reading statutes. For now, be sure to go over your class 
notes carefully, and try to follow each step that we took in class.  If you have 
any questions, please come to see me.  Are there any other questions? 
 
Student: Can we go on to the next case?  My head hurts. 
 
Instructor: Yes, we can.  But let’s close out Neri with a song. 
 
Neri and the U.C.C. 
[Sung to the tune of “Charlie and the MTA” by the The Kingston Trio]23 
 
Let me tell you the story of a man named Neri 
 On a tragic and fateful day. 
He put thousands in his pocket to put down on deposit 
 On a boat he would sail away. 
 
Chorus: But was his money returned? 
  No. It never returned. 
  On the deal he got quite burned.  Poor old Neri . . . 
  He will wander the halls 
  Outside the courts of justice. 
  The U.C.C., he never will learn. 
 
 23. Although a student, Kevin Batt, Boston University School of Law class of 1996, wrote 
the words to this song, most current students have not heard of The Kingston Trio and are not 
familiar with this song.  In fact, I used to think I was funny by referring to Lord Mansfield’s three 
kinds of covenants in Kingston v. Preston, 98 Eng. Rep. 606 (1773), as “The Kingston Trio.”  I 
stopped making this comment a few years ago, after belatedly realizing that almost nobody knew 
what I was talking about. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] EXERCISING WITH NERI V. RETAIL MARINE CORP. 1509 
 
After paying the deposit, he felt strangely spasmodic, 
 and by morning he felt quite ill. 
To the dealer his lawyer wrote: “Go on.  Just keep the boat.” 
 The dealer said: “He pays the bill.” 
 
Chorus: And was his money returned? 
  No, it was never returned. 
  A contract, you shall not spurn.  Poor old Neri . . . 
  He will wander the halls 
  Outside the courts of justice. 
  The U.C.C., he never could learn. 
 
Neri thought he would win when the learned judge said: 
 “Just look in Section Seven-One-Eight.” 
But, on further perusal, sir, I fear you’re bamboozled. 
 Seven-Zero-Eight rules your fate. 
 
Chorus: And was his money returned? 
  No, it never returned. 
  Double profits the dealer shall earn.  Poor law students . . . 
  We will wander the halls 
  Outside the courts of justice. 
  The U.C.C., we never shall learn. 
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